In this note, we demonstrate that the problem of "many-to-one matching with (strict) preferences over colleagues" is actually more difficult than the classical many-to-one matching problem, "matching without preferences over colleagues." We give an explicit reduction of any problem of the latter type to a problem of the former type. This construction leads to the first algorithm which finds all stable matchings in the setting of "matching without preferences over colleagues," for any set of preferences. Our construction directly extends to generalized matching settings.
Introduction
The literature on two-sided matching markets has grown substantially in recent years following high-profile applications of matching in labor markets and school choice programs.
2 Most practical applications of matching mechanisms require stable matchings, matchings for which no set of agents (strictly) prefers to match among itself than to be matched to its assigned set of partners. However, methods for finding the set of all stable matchings have proven difficult to obtain, even in classical matching settings. 3 In this note, we give the first algorithm for finding the complete set of stable matchings in any (classical) many-to-one matching market. 4 This algorithm follows from a reduction of the classical matching problem to "matching with (strict) preferences over colleagues," a nonclassical matching problem which has recently been solved by Echenique and Yenmez (2007) .
Our Results
In their work, Echenique and Yenmez (2007) informally claimed the problem of finding stable matchings in the setting of "matching with (strict) preferences over colleagues," to be somehow more difficult than the problem of finding stable matchings in the classical many-to-one matching setting. 5 We demonstrate in Section 3 that this proposition is true: every classical many-toone matching problem may be solved in the setting of Echenique and Yenmez (2007) . This result is surprising because the addition of strict preferences over colleagues to a classical matching problem amounts to breaking a large number of indifferences, 6 and such tie-breaking can affect the set of stable matchings. 7 Our methods are constructive and therefore give rise to an algorithm, discussed in Section 3.3, for finding all stable many-to-one matchings in the classical setting. This construction is nontrivial-as we discuss in Section 4, the relationship between the two matching settings is more subtle than Echenique and Yenmez (2007) appear to have observed. All of our results extend to generalized matching settings; in particular, they may be applied in the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts.
Survey of the Related Literature
In their seminal paper on two-sided matching, Gale and Shapley (1962) constructively demonstrated that stable matchings always exist in one-to-one and many-to-one (respectively, "marriage" and "college admissions") matching markets when agents have strict, responsive preferences. However, their algorithm only finds extremal matchings, those matchings which are most preferred by agents on one side of the market.
Extremal matchings may not be reasonable outcomes for practical mechanism design. Moreover, preferences may not be responsive in practice, even in otherwise classical matching problems. For these problems and for more general matching settings such as those of "matching with contracts" (Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) ), the set the existence of median stable matchings in a variety of settings; these matchings represent one natural realization of the idea of a compromise matching. 4 We allow general preferences. In particular, we do not require that participants in the market have responsive preferences.
5 Of course, these two problems coincide in the setting of one-to-one matching, since there no agent has colleagues. 6 In the original problem, each student s is indifferent between attending college c with colleague set S 1 and attending college c with colleague set S 2 = S 1 . Since the framework of Echenique and Yenmez (2007) requires strict preferences, student s must be assigned a strict preference over S 1 and S 2 ; thus, tie-breaking is required.
7 Abdulkadìroǧlu et al. (Forthcoming) discussed how tie-breaking creates "artificial stability constraints."
of stable matchings may be empty and may be unusually structured even when it is nonempty. 8 Thus, it is desirable to understand the complete set of stable matchings. Departing from the prior work on many-to-one matching, 9 Dutta and Massó (1997) introduced "matching with (strict) preferences over colleagues," 10 a nonclassical manyto-one matching model in which colleges are matched to students who have strict preferences over both their assigned colleges and their student colleagues.
11 They showed that the set of core matchings in this problem is always nonempty when student preferences are college-lexicographic, that is, when students care first about their colleges and then about their colleagues within that college.
12 Additionally, they showed that the core is also nonempty in a large class of colleague-lexicographic problems with couples. Revilla (2007) extended these results to the case of general preferences over colleagues and introduced new conditions guaranteeing the existence of core matchings. In recent work, Pycia (2007) found a condition both sufficient and-in some sense-necessary for the existence of stable matchings in the presence of both peer effects and complementarities between agents.
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Recently, Echenique and Yenmez (2007) solved the Dutta and Massó (1997) "matching with (strict) preferences over colleagues" model, obtaining an algorithm which finds all stable matchings in this setting.
14 This result was surprising, in part because no algorithm for finding all stable matchings in the classical many-to-one matching problem (with unrestricted preferences) was available. As we discuss in Section 3.3, the Echenique and Yenmez (2007) algorithm plays a key role in our results. Specifically, our algorithm for finding all stable matchings in classical many-to-one matching settings is obtained by combining our reduction (presented in Section 3) with the algorithm of Echenique and Yenmez (2007) .
Model, Notations, and Conventions
There is a set C of colleges and a set S of students. We consider two types of college-student matching problems in this paper: matchings without and with strict 8 Hatfield and Kojima (2007) have demonstrated that extremal matchings need not exist in a matching market with contracts, even when the set of stable matchings is nonempty.
9 Most work on many-to-one matching (e.g., Gale and Shapley (1962) , Kelso and Crawford (1982) , Roth (1985) , and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) ) assumes that agents on one side of the market only have preferences over agents (or sets of agents) on the opposite side of the market. 10 We add the "strict" qualifier to the title "matching with preferences over colleagues" which has been used in the literature, in order to emphasize the importance of strict preferences in the "matching with preferences over colleagues" model. 11 The colleagues of a student s are the students who are assigned to the same college as s. 12 Dutta and Massó (1997) , Revilla (2007) , and Pycia (2007) actually used the language of "workers" and "firms," rather than that of "students" and "colleges." However, our work is most closely related to that of Echenique and Yenmez (2007) , who phrased the many-to-one matching problem as a "college admissions" problem. Thus, we use the college admissions language uniformly throughout.
13 Dimitrov and Lazarova (2008) took this work a step further, viewing "matching with (strict) preferences over colleagues" as a weakened model of coalition formation. They presented a generalized to a situation in which coalition formation is allowed on both sides of the market and coalitions themselves can "match" together.
14 Kojima (2007) extended the method of Echenique and Yenmez (2007) to obtain an algorithm for finding all stable one-to-one matchings in the presence of couple constraints. preferences over colleagues, respectively called classical and nonclassical matchings.
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In both types of matching problems, each college c ∈ C is assumed to have a strict, transitive, and complete preference relation P c over the set ℘(S) of subsets of S. In classical matching problems, each student s ∈ S is assumed to have a strict, transitive, and complete preference relation P s over the set C ∪ {∅}; such a preference relation is called a classical preference relation. By contrast, in nonclassical matching problems, students s ∈ S have strict, transitive, and complete preference relationsP s over the sets (C × ℘(S) s ) ∪ {(∅, ∅)}, where ℘(S) s = {S ∈ ℘(S) : s ∈ S }; these relations are called nonclassical preference relations. For notational convenience, we write only the individually rational component of a preference relation, so that if being unmatched is preferable to being matched to some χ, then χ does not appear in the preference relation.
The nonstrict part of a preference relation P i is denoted by R i . For a preference relation P c over elements of ℘(S), we define the s-restriction P c | s of P c to be the preference relation on ℘(S) s induced by P c . That is, if S 1 P c · · · P c S k P c ∅, and {j 1 , . . . , j k } ⊂ {1, . . . , k} is the set of indices j for which s ∈ S j , with j 1 < · · · < j k , then the preference relation P c | s is given by
We say that a mapping µ supported on C ∪ S is a classical matching if 1. µ(c) ∈ ℘(S) for all c ∈ C, 2. µ(s) ∈ C ∪ {∅} for all s ∈ S, and 3. s ∈ µ(c) if and only if µ(s) = c.
Similarly, a mapping ν on C ∪ S is said to be a nonclassical matching if
3. ν(s) = (c, ν(c)) whenever s ∈ ν(c), and 4. ν(c) = S whenever (c, S ) = ν(s) for some s ∈ S.
A classical preference profile (resp. nonclassical preference profile) is a collection of preference relations {P c } c∈C ∪ {P s } s∈S associated to a classical matching problem (resp. a nonclassical matching problem). We treat a preference profile as a map from S ∪ C to the appropriate set of preference relations.
For a classical matching µ and classical preference profile P, a triple (C , S , µ ) (with C ⊂ C, S ⊂ S, and µ a classical matching) such that
(where P i = P(i)), and 15 Of course, there are multiple nonclassical many-to-one matching models. However, in this paper we will only address one, the model of "matching with (strict) preferences over colleagues" introduced by Dutta and Massó (1997) and studied by Echenique and Yenmez (2007) . 16 For a concrete example: if {s 1 , s 2 }Pc{s 1 }Pc{s 2 }Pc∅, then the preference relation Pc| s 2 is given by {s 1 , s 2 } Pc| s 2 {s 2 }.
for some
is called a P-blocking triple for µ. A classical matching µ is said to be stable with respect to a classical preference profile P if there exists no P-blocking triple for µ. Analogously, for a nonclassical matching ν and nonclassical preference profileP, a triple (C , S , ν ) (with C ⊂ C, S ⊂ S, and ν a nonclassical matching) is aPblocking triple for ν if
A nonclassical matching ν is said to be stable with respect to a nonclassical preference profileP if there exists noP-blocking triple for ν.
Reducing Classical Matching to Nonclassical Matching
In this section, we show that, for any classical preference profile P, there is an associated nonclassical preference profileP(P) such that the nonclassical matchings stable with respect toP(P) exactly correspond to the classical matchings stable with respect to P.
The Construction
We present an explicit construction of the nonclassical preference profileP(P). In Section 3.1.1, we provide a simple demonstrative example of this construction. We prove the correspondence between the nonclassical matchings stable with respect toP(P) and the classical matchings stable with respect to P in Section 3.2 and then revisit our example in Section 3.2.1. Then, in Section 3.3, we discuss how combining our construction and the results of Echenique and Yenmez (2007) yields an algorithm for finding all matchings stable with respect to P. Construction 1. Let P be a classical preference profile. Define a nonclassical preference profileP(P) by the following rules:
1. Set (P(P))(c) = P(c) for all c ∈ C. 2. For any s ∈ S, let P s = P(s), and write this preference relation in the form c 1 P s · · · P s c k P s ∅. 17 Then, for each college c j (1 ≤ j ≤ k), set P cj = P(c j ) and write the preference relation P cj s as S j,1 P cj s · · · P cj s S j, j .
(1) 17 Here, k = k(s) is the number of colleges c i ∈ C acceptable to s. Without loss of generality, we have assumed k ≥ 1, since if k = 0 then s does not need to be matched.
Finally, define the preference relationP s = (P(P))(s) by
(2)
Intuitively, this construction exactly aligns students' preferences over colleagues with colleges' preferences over sets of students.
A Simple Example
To clarify Construction 1, we discuss a simple illustrative example. Suppose that C = {c 1 , c 2 }, S = {s 1 , s 2 }, and write P i = P(i) for i ∈ C ∪ S. Suppose further that the preference relations P i are given by
Then, if we writeP i = (P(P))(i), Construction 1 gives that
Following the intuition described in the previous section, we observe that, under the preferences defined byP(P), a student s prefers a pair (c, S 1 ) ∈ (C ×℘(S) s )∪{(∅, ∅)} to another pair (c, S 2 ) ∈ (C × ℘(S) s ) ∪ {(∅, ∅)} if and only if c prefers S 1 to S 2 . Thus, student and college preferences over subsets of students are aligned.
The Matching Correspondence
In order to relate the stable matchings of the preference profiles P andP(P), we will need a bit more terminology. We define the college projection proj c ((c , S )) of a pair (c , S ) ∈ C × ℘(S) s by proj c ((c , S )) = c . For a nonclassical matching ν, we define the classical matching µ ν associated to ν by µ ν (c) = ν(c) (∀c ∈ C), µ ν (s) = proj c (ν(s)) (∀s ∈ S).
19
We may now state our main result.
Proposition 1. For a classical preference profile P, letP(P) be as defined in Construction 1. A classical matching µ is stable with respect to P if and only if there is a nonclassical matching ν stable with respect toP(P) such that µ ν ≡ µ.
Proof. For all i ∈ C ∪ S, we write P i = P(i) andP i = (P(P))(i). For the "if" direction, we consider some nonclassical matching ν stable with respect to the preference profileP(P) and suppose for the sake of contradiction that µ ν is not stable with respect to P. Then, there is some P-blocking triple (C , S , µ ) for µ ν . Now, for any c ∈ C 18 In this construction, the preference relation Ps defined by (2) is a well-defined nonclassical preference relation for the student s. Indeed, s ∈ S j, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ ≤ i by the definition (1) and no pair (c j , S j, ) is repeated in (2) because the preference relations Pc j are well-defined. 19 It is clear that this definition actually defines a classical matching µν .
and s ∈ µ (c), we know that µ (c)R c µ ν (c) and µ (s)R s µ ν (s). 20 By the construction ofP s , we then have
for any c ∈ C and s ∈ µ (c). Moreover, the relationship (3) is strict for at least one s ∈ S , since at least one of the relationships
is strict. But then, it follows quickly that the triple (C , S , ν ) with ν defined by
is aP(P)-blocking triple for ν, contradicting the stability of ν.
For the "only if" direction, it suffices to observe that the nonclassical matching ν defined by
is stable with respect toP(P). This follows directly from the stability of µ and the construction ofP(P), so we omit the details.
Revisiting the Simple Example
We now return to the example presented in Section 3.1.1 and observe that the unique nonclassical matching ν stable with respect toP(P) is given by
This nonclassical matching ν restricts to the unique classical matching µ stable with respect to P:
20 Here, we use the convention that ∅ ∈ C if the set C is empty.
Finding All Stable (Classical) Matchings
Echenique and Yenmez (2007) presented an algorithm finding all nonclassical matchings stable with respect to a given nonclassical preference profileP. Their approach uses a fixed-point characterization of stability-machinery which is not yet known to exist in the setting of classical many-to-one matching.
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Our Proposition 1 shows that, in theory, it is possible to find all classical matchings stable with respect to a classical preference profile P by applying the algorithm of Echenique and Yenmez (2007) toP(P). We must note, however, that such an operation is likely to be computationally costly. Indeed, if |P| denotes the length of the longest preference relation in a preference profileP, then |P(P)| = O(|P| 2 ) by construction. The size of the input data when running the Echenique and Yenmez (2007) algorithm onP(P) is therefore of the same order as the running time of the deferred acceptance algorithm run on P. 
Extensions
Our Construction 1 is essentially independent of the domains of the input preference relations. Thus, it admits simple generalizations to more complex matching settings. Most notably, an analogous construction may be used in the Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) setting of matching with contracts to reduce a classical "matching with contracts" problem to a problem of "matching with contracts and preferences over colleagues' contracts."
Variants of Construction 1
Although Proposition 1 shows that the problem of finding stable nonclassical matchings is more difficult than the problem of finding classical matchings, this relationship is rather subtle. 23 As we mentioned in Section 1, the process of constructing a nonclassical preference profileP (P) from a classical preference profile P entails a large amount of tie-breaking; if not executed carefully, such tie-breaking can affect the set of stable matchings.
An Illustrative Example
For an example of the effects of indiscriminate tie-breaking, we suppose that C = {c}, S = {s 1 , s 2 }, and that the classical preference profile P is given by {s 1 , s 2 }P c {s 1 }P c ∅, cP s1 ∅, cP s2 ∅, where P i = P(i) for all i ∈ C ∪ S. In order to construct a nonclassical preference profile from P which respects the ordering of preferencs in P, 24 we must break one indifference: that of s 1 between the options (c, {s 1 , s 2 }) and (c, {s 1 }).
Applying Construction 1 to P gives the following nonclassical preference profilē P(P):
(whereP i = (P(P))(i)). The unique matching ν stable with respect toP(P) is
If, instead, the indifference of s 1 between (c, {s 1 , s 2 }) and (c, {s 1 }) is broken differently, then a new nonclassical preference profileP (P) is obtained:
(whereP i = (P (P))(i)). There are two matchings stable with respect toP (P): ν and ν , where
While µ ν is the unique matching stable with respect to P, it is clear that µ ν ≡ µ ν is not stable with respect to P. Thus, we see thatP(P) is the only nonclassical preference profile which both respects the preference ordering of P and yields a bijective stable matching correspondence.
Discussion
The example just presented demonstrates that a nonclassical preference profilē P (P) ≡P(P) constructed from a classical preference profile P may not admit a bijective stable matching correspondence.
Nonetheless, we may obtain the reverse implication of Proposition 1 under relatively intuitive conditions which are weaker than the requirement of the full form of Construction 1. This is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Let P be a classical preference profile, and letP (P) be a nonclassical preference profile such that 1. (P (P))(c) = P(c) for all c ∈ C, 2. if cP s ∅ and S P c ∅ for some s ∈ S, c ∈ C, and S ∈ ℘(S) s , then (c, S )P s (∅, ∅), 3. if (c 1 , S 1 )R s (c 2 , S 2 ) for some s ∈ S, c 1 , c 2 ∈ C, and S 1 , S 2 ∈ ℘(S) s , then c 1 R s c 2 ,
where P i = P(i) andP i = (P (P))(i) for all i ∈ C ∪ S. Then, if µ is a matching stable with respect to P, the matching ν defined by
is stable with respect toP (P).
The proof of Proposition 2 is immediate from the fact that the preference profilē P (P) respects the preference orderings of P. Indeed, it follows quickly from the conditions of the proposition statement that, if (C , S , ν ) is a (P (P))-blocking triple for ν, then (C , S , µ ν ) is a P-blocking triple for µ.
Although Proposition 2 recovers the reverse implication of Proposition 1 under general conditions, the forward implication of Proposition 1 need not hold under these conditions. 25 We might hope for a general classification of the set of constructions alternative to Construction 1 which admit bijective correspondence results akin to Proposition 1. Unfortunately, such a classification appears to be out of reach. When restricted to a particular classical preference profile P, this problem includes (as a subproblem) the question of finding all permutations of the preference relations inP(P) which fix the set of stable matchings 26 ; this question is not well-understood, even within the simpler setting of one-to-one matching. 
